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FROM PENN CENTRAL TO LINGLE:
THE LONG BACKWARDS ROAD
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION

My major task in this Symposium is to supply the golden
mean between the two previous articles. Professor Dale Whitman
has offered us a rigorous legal analysis of various precedents in
this vexed area of land use law.' Thereafter, Professor Richard
Green supplied an insightful economic analysis of all the land use
material fits together.2 My task is to blend some law with some
economics in order to address the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.3 I hope to examine the (negative)

contribution that the Supreme Court's decision has made to a
systematic understanding of the larger law governing the taking of
private property. In order to do so I shall divide the analysis into
five parts. The first analyzes the doomed test of a regulatory
taking that the Supreme Court applies in Agins v. City of
Tiburon.4 The second part analyzes the peculiar bit of economic
protectionism that is found in Hawaii Act 257. The third part
analyzes and applies the well-known tripartite test for takings
articulated by Justice Brennan in Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. City of New York. 6 The fourth part critiques the Penn Central

decision, and the fifth part defends the proposition that the
current muddle in takings law is not an accident, but comes from
the consistent unwillingness of the Supreme Court to apply the
James

Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover
Institution. My thanks to David Strandness, Stanford Law School, Class of
2007 for his usual excellent and timely research assistance.
1. Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings
Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 581 (2007).
2. Richard Green, Oliver T. Carr Professor of Real Estate Finance at
George Washington University, Address at The John Marshall Law School,
Center for Real Estate Law, 2006 Kratovil Conference: The Takings Clause
Clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 29, 2006).
3. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

5. HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (2006). For full text, see the appendix.
6. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

The John Marshall Law Review

[40:593

systematic view of private property that has developed on the
private law side into constitutional law.
I.

THE DOOMED AGINS TEST

To set the stage, let me start by noting that Lingle put in the
crosshairs the standard formula, first articulated in Agins v. City
of Tiburon,' that the United States Supreme Court has used on
multiple occasions to analyze regulatory takings.
That case
announced that a government regulation of private property
should be treated as though it "effects a taking if [that regulation]
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The
clear negative implication is that if the regulation does advance a
legitimate state interest, then it is impermissible to find a
(compensable) taking, which in fact was the fate of the land owner
in Agins. On its face, the formula does not appear to move the ball
forward because it deflects the takings inquiry into the still more
nebulous question of what counts as "legitimate state interests."
Yet the Agins decision offers no serious insight on that question.
Rather, its studied use of conclusory language was consciously
meant to signal that the scope of the government power was
greater than that which is)found under the traditional, and
somewhat more descriptive, account of the police power that
limited the appropriate justifications to the "health, safety, morals
and general welfare" of the public at large.9
Historically, Agins's shift in language signaled the Supreme
Court's ratification of the proposition that the government could
impose a broad range of regulations free of the obligation to
compensate. In Agins that power was used to its best advantage,
as the Court sustained a Tiburon ordinance that required a
minimum lot size of five acres because it advanced the legitimate
state purpose of preventing development that might well change
the character of the neighborhood by increasing population
density. ° It goes without saying, of course, that local governments
could have a legitimate interest in concentrating development in
particular areas as well. Indeed the range of legitimate purposes
is in some sense so broad that the Agins test provides virtually no
constitutional safeguards against the traditional forms of land use
regulation. Put in a different sense, the legitimate state purpose
language is very close to the "conceivable" public purpose language
that has darkened the Court's discussion of the public use
requirement of the takings clause." But even if we assume that
7.
8.
9.
York,
10.
11.

447 U.S. 255.
Id. at 260.
It is no surprise that this formula finds resonance in Lochner v. New
198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62.
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
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this account captures the sense of the words "public use", it is
sadly misplaced here.
Public use allows for takings with
compensation. The regulation question seeks to explain what
justifications allow for regulation without compensation. It is hard
to think that the same or similar words could serve these two
disparate objectives simultaneously.
This analytical difficulty notwithstanding, Agins is a
predictable outgrowth of the original Supreme Court zoning
decision, Euclid v Ambler Realty Co.," which allowed for extensive
land use regulation without compensation, while paying lip service
to the traditional definition of the police power - in that instance
by expanding the notion of nuisance beyond its common law
foundations. The legitimate state interest language pushes the
process a step further by uncoupling the police power from its
common law roots that were still noticeable in Euclid, all with the
express agenda of enlarging state power. Think nuisance and
Agins comes out for the landowner, for no one could contend
seriously that any building on five acres or more is needed to
prevent odors and filth from migrating between the properties of
the rich and famous.
In one of those constant mysteries in the takings law,
however, the parties in Lingle proceeded on the novel assumption
that this broad Agins test places substantial limitations on the use
of government power. Lingle arose in connection with a Hawaii
statute that sought in a number of ways to limit the ability of
large oil companies to deal with its lessee-dealers, those firms that
leased their service stations. 3 The particular provisions limited by
complex formula the increases in rent that the oil companies could
impose on their protected tenants. All increases were limited to
fifteen percent of the profits on gasoline sales, plus fifteen percent
of the gross sales that the dealers receive from the other products
they sell, with a further adjustment to offset any increase in rent
that the oil company is obligated to pay on its underlying ground
lease. That provision blocked the introduction by Chevron of a
new rental policy that would have required its lessee-dealers to
pay rentals tied to an escalating percentage of rents. The statute
also blocked the ability of the oil companies to remove the current
tenants from the leased premises at the expiration of the lease,
and it prevented the oil companies from setting up new stations in
the immediate proximity of existing stations. It also explicitly
guaranteed to the individual holders of service stations the right to
sell their interests in the open market, free of any interference
from the landlord. The combined impact of those provisions that
dealt with leasehold extensions and rate limitations meant that

12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (2006). For full text, see the appendix.
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the lessors could not evict the tenant when the alternative use of
the property was far more valuable. The entire purpose of the
statute was to create a wealth transfer from the lessors to the
protected dealer-lessees, which could be documented by making
any assessment of the market value of their respective interests.
The decision of Justice O'Connor is notable for its near
obsessive concern with textual detail. When she speaks of the
relationship of Agins to Lingle, her sole concern is with parsing the
language of Agins to explain why it does not accurately capture
the rules on regulatory takings. The gist of her argument is that
the test looks at only one portion of the means/ends test, which in
her view is more appropriate to a due process test than to a
takings challenge, even if the grounds for distinction are obscure,
to say the least. In addition, she noted that test does not take into
account the character of the regulation or its distributional impact
on the various parties. It does not, in a word, read like the threepart test for takings that the Court articulated in its decision in
Penn Central v. City of New York. 4
Wholly absent from her conscientious dissection of Agins is
the want of any substantive examination of the actual impact of
the Act on the respective positions of the landlords who are subject
to its provisions, or the lessees who benefit from the operation. As
David Callies rightly noted in his introductory address for this
symposium, the early death by legislative repeal of the statute is
not to be lamented.15 But it hardly helps to analyze this statute
under Agins without some substantive view of its underlying
scheme. Nor is it helpful to say that the state has, here or
anywhere else, a legitimate interest in responding with high
prices. If that's a legitimate interest, then the state also has a
legitimate interest in combating low prices. When these two
interests are combined, then for any set of observed prices, the
state has a legitimate interest in trying to either raise them or
lower them. So, by the time this exercise is finished, under either
Penn Central or Agins the law develops a perfectly vacuous test to
determine which ordinances should survive, and which should be
struck down. Litigators, of course, don't care whether the test is
vacuous. What they care about is whether the test gives them a
14. 438 U.S. 104.

15. David L. Callies, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law at the William S.
Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, Keynote
Address at The John Marshall Law School, Center for Real Estate Law, 2006
Kratovil Conference: The Takings Clause Clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court
(Sept. 29, 2006); see also 2006 HAW. SESS. LAWS 78 which was signed by the

Governor May 5, 2006. That law indefinitely suspends the wholesale gas price
controls that the state legislature had imposed in 2005, but it does not appear
to affect § 486H-10.4. For a brief description of the recently passed law, see
ABC News, Hawaii Gives Up On Gas Price Control, http://abcnews.go.comUS/
wireStory?id= 1936960&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312.
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plausible basis on which they can win a lawsuit. And so as we go
through the particulars of this case, we should find at least some
account of the Act that sets the rental provision in the larger
context, thus making the nature of this wealth transfer wholly
evident.

II. ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM, HAWAII STYLE
To set the stage, it is important to understand that this Act is
a classic piece of economic protectionism of the most ugly variety,
benefiting independent dealers operating in the state of Hawaii.
What the Court did was focus on the one provision that is
sufficiently complicated to frustrate understanding - the rental
provision - without revealing just how protectionist Act 257 is.16
The rate cap does allow for rents to increase with revenues in most
cases, and with profits in the case of gasoline. But if the cap
consistently was above the market or lease, then no one would
choose to fight its existence. The law would be equivalent to
setting the minimum wage at five dollars per hour when the
market rate is at ten dollars. Similarly, even if we do not know
the exact operation of this statute, we can be confident that it does
not allow for a dollar-for-dollar offset by the simple device of
raising gasoline prices. Presumably somewhere and somehow this
cap has to bind, if not this year, then next. It counts as a
fundamental theorem of sorts that ardent protectionists do not
expend their political capital to pass idle acts.
That said, the anticompetitive aspects of other provisions in
the Act are very clear. The territorial protections that the Act
affords incumbents look like a straight-out division of markets
that surely benefits the established dealers and only frustrates the
efforts of out-of-state manufacturers to expand their market
presence. The automatic renewal provision imitates the most
obnoxious feature of all rent control laws. It takes a short term
lease, and regards renewal as a free good for the benefit of tenants,
which makes it impossible to remove incompetent dealers by
waiting until the expiration of the lease. Now one has to buy them
out, which hardly creates the desired incentives for excellent
service. The tenant can of course throw off the lease if the value of
the property goes down. But if it goes up then the option is worth
exercising, which results in an implicit wealth transfer from
landlord to tenant, equal to the capitalized value of the difference
between the market and statutory rental rates. By allowing free
assignability of the leasehold interest, Act 257 lets the present
incumbent capture this differential by assigning the interest to a
newcomer for a lump sum that is the best approximation of the

16. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543-44.
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discounted value of the future differential between market and
contract rent.
The conclusion seems inescapable that Hawaii's Act 257 looks
like an extremely easy case of expropriation.
But Justice
O'Connor was so focused on the verbal weaknesses of the Agins
test that these economic matters were the last thing on her mind.
In this regard, she was hardly helped by the focus of the expert
testimony offered below. There the noted economic experts on
both sides mainly discussed whether the reduced rents to the
lessee-dealers would be passed onto consumers. The Ninth Circuit
summarized the situation as follows:
The district court on remand heard testimony from Dr. John R.
Umbeck, on behalf of Chevron, and Dr. Keith Leffier, on behalf of
Hawaii. Based on their testimony, the court made the following
relevant findings of fact: (1) oil companies will raise wholesale prices
to offset any decrease in rent imposed by Act 257, thereby causing
an increase in retail prices, (2) a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that Act 257 will enable lessee-dealers to sell their
leaseholds at a premium, (3) instead of decreasing retail gasoline
prices by maintaining the presence of lessee-dealers in the market,
Act 257 will increase gasoline prices by reducing the number of
lessee-dealers. Based on these findings, the district court concluded
that Act 257 does not substantially advance a legitimate state

interest. 17
The first of these findings seems odd, for if it were true then the
dollar-for-dollar offset should imply that the statute has no effect
on rents, at which point it is hard to explain why the Act would
work an increase in retail prices, or why, as noted earlier, the
lessee-dealers would work so hard for a provision that did not
improve their economic position.
The second finding is
unquestionable, and offers conclusive evidence of the implicit
wealth transfer. The third finding also looks correct since the
territorial exclusions should on balance reduce the number of
lessee-dealers. But all in all, the facial examination of Act 257
tells us all we need to know about who benefits and who loses. It
is evident that the financial wealth of the oil companies did not
help advance their political agenda when the local dealers had all
the clout. The statute is a massive embarrassment, so the Court
should have just struck it down.
When the case was before the Ninth Circuit, Hawaii
abandoned the argument that Act 257 could lower consumer prices
(by insulating dealers from competition, of course), but then
shifted its position to make the last gasp argument that it was
17. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 855 (9th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted), affg Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Haw. 2002). Bronster was reversed by
Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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proper to invoke the statute to protect lessee-dealers from the loss
of their franchise. 8 The entire expert dispute seems too obvious
for words. Why would dealers work so hard to protect consumers
at their own expense unless they received something from it? The
issue of expropriation, moreover, should not turn on the question
of whether the lessee-dealers had imbibed the spirit of Robin
Hood, or whether they just sought to advance their own interests.
Assume the former, and it is still not a defense against a taking
from A to B show that B has given some portion of the spoils to C.
As in so many cases, the only point that should occupy the
attention of the Court is that the deliberate interference with
ongoing contract relationships necessarily operates as a wealth
transfer between the parties. At that point, the state could pay
the oil companies for what it allows the lessee-dealers to take, or
repeal the statute. And we know that once the implicit cost of the
regulation is placed on the books, transparency will do its work,
for no sane legislator would seek to tax his or her constituents for
this parochial purpose.
This short exposition also tells us something about the
unfortunate consequences that follow from some low-level rational
basis review. Judges are often eager to say that the economics of a
transaction is so complicated that we have to allow the legislatures
to decide such question. But in truth, in this case the fingerprints
of special interests are on every syllable of the statute, so that the
net effect of the rational basis test is to force judges to turn
somersaults to deny the obvious, in order to make the world safe
for the kind of blatant political malfeasance embodied in Act 257.
III.

PENN CENTRAL APPLIED

The irony, however, is that although Justice O'Connor's
prolonged deliberation evaded the Agins test, she gave her
endorsement to the standard Penn Central test for regulation with
its tripartite formula that is no more responsive to the underlying
substantive issues than is Agins. Recall by way of background
that Penn Central gave a clear pass to the landmark preservation
statute in New York City which allowed the city to prevent the use
of the air rights over the Penn Central Terminal in order to
preserve the distinctive view of that landmark. A simple direct
analysis of that case notes that air rights are standard property
rights in New York, which can be developed, mortgaged, leased, or
sold. The only distinctive feature about them is that they
necessarily require some support rights from below. But those
details only go to the full delineation of the bundle of rights and its
market value.

18. Id. at 855-57.
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Any sound system of takings law recognizes that the
government has the right to take by coercion even in
circumstances where private parties can only acquire by voluntary
purchase. But that analysis allows the state to condemn the air
rights to preserve the public views, but only if it is prepared to pay
the owner their market value. Justice Brennan, however, thought
that it was better that New York be able to block the construction
at no cost at all, so he refused to follow the state law
characterization of property and developed, without argument, an
alternative approach.
His first move was to denature the
relatively strong statement about property rights that was found
in Armstrong v. United States: "The 'Fifth Amendment's
guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'" 9 But Justice
Brennan's basic move was to insist that the Court has been unable
to develop any "set formula" to answer this question, so that "ad
hoc" formulations are needed."° The upshot is his full version of
the famous Penn Central test:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations.
So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
21
to promote the common good.
Justice O'Connor shows fealty to this decision when she writes:
"The Penn Central factors... have served as the principal
guidelines for resolving regulatory takings that do not fall within
the physical takings or Lucas rules."'
It should be apparent,
however how little this list of factors advances the inquiry into the
constitutionality of Act 257.
The economic impact of that
regulation is negative on the oil companies and positive to the
dealer-lessees, but in proportions that are difficult to determine.
The inquiry is even more difficult than might appear because it
seems proper to take all the provisions of the limitation into
account together, and not isolate the price limitation for separate
consideration. That comprehensive evaluation tilts the case in
19. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
20. Id. at 124.
21. Id.
22. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
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favor of invalidation, but cannot, given the squishy nature of the
tripartite test, conclude the inquiry.
The interference with "investment-backed expectations" is
also difficult to assess. Act 257 honored those expectations, after a
fashion, by allowing a dollar-for-dollar pass through of any
increases in the ground lease, which counts as a plus for the Act.
But at the same time, it clearly blocked the rent flexibility that the
oil companies thought that they had for good commercial reasons
built into their leases. It is hard to sort these elements out in the
context of Penn Central, for Justice Brennan wrote only about
changes in land use, and held that new uses were not protected so
long as existing uses covered costs. 3 My guess is that he would
think that this factor therefore cut in favor of the state because it
did not force the oil companies to go out of pocket, but only
removed opportunities for future gain. Stated otherwise, he would
show a lot of tolerance for government actions that were directed
only to money, not towards use, as was the case with traditional
rent control legislation, which has long been judged by that sort of
relaxed standard." Finally, on the physical/regulatory line, it
seems clear in principle that the inability to recover possession at
the termination of a lease amounts to a physical taking. But the
entire history of the rent control laws rejects that characterization,
and Justice O'Connor herself badly misfired on this issue when
she held that so long as the tenant is allowed in for a year, then it
should be treated as though he were allowed in to the property in
perpetuity.25
Only in the topsy-turvy world of constitutional
accounting is the length of leasehold provision a side element in
the bargain. My guess therefore is that this case would in the end
be treated as a garden variety rent control statute under Penn
Central, from which there is no relief.
IV. PENN CENTRAL CRITIQUED

The overall analysis takes a very different turn if we start
with a critique of the Penn Central decision on which Justice
O'Connor places such confidence.26 Justice O'Connor did not fill
any conceptual gap by offering some reasoned defense of the test.
Rather, her only stab in that direction was the unilluminating
statement that the major impetus of the Court's jurisprudence is
to identify forms of regulation that "are functionally equivalent to
23. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
24. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976)
(invalidating a five year rollback in rents with no provision for increases of

any sort).
25. See Yee v. Vill. of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
26. For my longer critique of the decision, see Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs
and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, 1 CATO SUP.
CT. REv. 5 (2002).
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the classic taking," 7 without considering that all of them are.
Most critically she did not explain why the constitutional test
should differ from the private law approach, which places two
propositions front and center: first, no owner is entitled to
compensation for the negative economic impact from competition,
and, second, any landowner may block the efforts of any neighbor
to impose unilaterally a restrictive covenant on land use. That
difference is, however, wholly obscured in the Penn Central
formulation, which treats legal restrictions and competitive impact
as indistinguishable from each other by rightly rejecting the
proposition that "diminution in property value, standing alone, can
establish a 'taking" - only to misapply it in the same breath by
assuming that the imposition of a state restrictive covenant
through a zoning ordinance counts as a simple diminution in
value, without more.'
In principle, however, the difference between zoning
restrictions and economic competition as the source of value
reduction is critical. Recall that competition advances social
welfare in the way in which the simple expropriation of a partial
interest in land does not. Nor is the Penn Central test saved by
the observation that large damages are compensable, but smaller
ones are not. That position makes no more sense than saying that
a landowner can recover nothing if the property taken is worth a
thousand dollars but recover everything if it is worth a million
dollars. The usual and proper rule is that the extent of damages
governs nothing more than the extent of compensation. It never
functions as an on/off switch to see whether compensation is owing
at all.
Nor does Justice O'Connor offer the slightest explanation of
why Justice Brennan was correct to use the tendentious phrase
"investment backed expectations" to determine the scope of the
takings clause. That term appears nowhere in the Constitution,
27. "Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized
as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn
Central), share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking .... Lingle, 544
U.S. at 542.
28. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131:

Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land-use
regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related
to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition
that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a
"taking," see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75%
diminution in value caused by zoning law) ....
Note that Justice Brennan is writing in the Euclid tradition, which makes it
hard to defend the landowner's position in Penn Central. Justice Rehnquist's

dissent stresses the "spot zoning" aspect of the case, i.e., the singling out of
Penn Central's property for special treatment creates an impermissible burden
on the single owner. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138-39.
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and it evokes no clearly defined meaning. It surely cannot refer to
the notion that property is unprotected if it is acquired by gift.
Nor could it mean that the only property rights that are protected
are those that have already been utilized. To the contrary, the
function of property is to create security of title so that people do
not have to build foolishly today in order to perfect their rights to
develop the property tomorrow, which is what this unfortunate
phrase seems to suggest. In the end, therefore, the Penn Central
test was meant to convey the view that if the landowner could
make effective use of his existing ground interest, then he had no
right to use the air rights as well, because he could cover his costs
of operation without being able to exploit the common law
development rights.
Unfortunately, this position makes no more sense than
allowing the state to take the north end of the land for free
because the south end has been fully developed so that it covers
the cost of acquisition for the whole. Justice Brennan's position
has created immense difficulties in deciding what should be done
when the air rights, as it were, went right down to the ground, so
that no development could take place at all.29 At this point, the
landowner has no current viable use of property that covers initial
costs, so that it is not possible to adopt without adjustment the
Penn Central strategy of allowing current uses to continue while
prohibiting new ones from taking place. In responding to this
difficulty Justice O'Connor is happy to repeat the familiar bromide
that "the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using
her property [is] perhaps the most fundamental of all property
interests."0
Justice O'Connor seems aware that the "most
fundamental" interest cannot be the only one,3' for if it were, then
the state could respect the landowner's right to exclude others on
the one hand while excluding the landowner himself. Clearly any
impoverished definition of private property that literally only
encompassed the right to exclude should - an indeed does flunk constitutional scrutiny. The takings protection is reduced to
a hollow shell if the interests in entry, occupation, use,
development and disposition are allowed unceremoniously to fall
to the cutting room floor because somehow they do not rate as
fundamental. Yet once these other rights are admitted back into
the bundle, it is an utter mystery why they should be regarded as
second-tier for constitutional purposes when they have equal
dignity with the right to exclude as a matter of the private law.
Nor does the Penn Central test do better on its third element.
The character of the government action refers to the undefended

29. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
31. See supra note 27.
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categorical distinction between physical and regulatory takings,
where the former are said to be governed by a near per se rule for
compensation and the latter is subject to the very weak standards
of rational basis review.32 Justice O'Connor is of course right that
physical dispossession by government should be strongly
discouraged, but does not explain why that principle does not
reach the air rights that were placed off limits in Penn Central or
the lease renewal provisions in Lingle, which of course keep the
landlord out of possession when the lease expires, and thus denies
him the right to exclude in the future. And even if these various
forms of occupation are not at issue, Justice O'Connor never
explains why the restrictive covenant that the state unilaterally
imposes is not a taking of the development or use rights inherent
in land.
In the end, Justice O'Connor's merciless dissection of the
incomplete Agins formula leads her to jump from the frying pan
into the fire. At the conceptual level, under Penn Central, no one
quite knows the definition of the parcel of rights that are protected
by the Takings Clause. No one knows how much diminution in
value is required before a landowner is entitled to compensation,
and no one knows what kind of public justifications cut off the
right to reparations. Dale Whitman confesses that he does not
understand how this test works twenty-eight years after this
formulation.' No one else who litigates these matters does either.
V. PRIVATE PROPERTY VERSUS "CONSTITUTIONAL" PRIVATE
PROPERTY

The impasse over Act 257 is neither unique nor ephemeral,
for it exposes the enduring disjunction between the massive
sophistication that private lawyers use to wring every ounce of
value out of private property and the primitive tools that
constitutional lawyers use to drain private property of its value
and utility by removing from it the key attributes of use,
development, and distribution.
The key to the success of the private law in this area is that
lawyers know that unlocking the value from property often
depends on the ability to break down the property rights in land
(or indeed any other asset) into its constituent elements. Hence
the initial owner who acquires private property by occupation has
the undivided fee simple, which he is free to divide by time, by
leases, by concurrent interests, through tenancies in common, by
credit instruments, through mortgages, by physical divisions, as

32. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419

(1982) (affirming that permanent occupation by the government of physical
property constitutes a taking).
33. Whitman, supra note 1, at 589.
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through air and mineral rights, and through covenants and
easements between neighbors. Those owners all follow the simple
proposition that they will enter into any complex transaction of
property rights if the gain from the subdivision of rights exceeds
the transaction costs needed to bring those gains about. As those
costs are reduced by more sophisticated contracting and
registration, the state of a title assumes an ever more complex
state in which the sum of the rights remains constant while the
A sensible
value of the rights in separate hands increases.
constitutional law would track the private law so as to allow, each
of these elements to be created. To the private lawyer, all property
rights have equal dignity no matter how defined, so long as they
derived from a single grant from the original owners. But our
constitutional law holds exactly the opposite, such that
fragmented interests, such as air rights or restrictive covenants,
are subject to confiscation when separated from the original fee
simple interest.
We can see this massive difference by looking at how private
law treats restrictive covenants, which restrict the use of land
owned by others, and easements, which allow entrance over land
owned by others. The private law has worked long and hard to
unify these two branches of law so that both easements and
servitudes have become part of the larger law of servitudes.' Yet
one look at Justice Scalia's decision in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal
Commission35 shows just how far astray from this basic conception
the Supreme Court has gone, even for Justices with some
There the Court
inclination for protecting property rights.
of
of the doctrine
some version
applied
ingeniously
unconstitutional conditions by holding that the state could not
extract a lateral easement over the front of Nollan's land by
threatening to withhold the permit to build.36 It only had to reach
that position because it was caught in the intellectual vice of
Euclid, which had led all members of the present Supreme Court
to take the position that easements are property because they're
possessory, but restrictive covenants are not (really) property
because they are only rights that restrict the use that others make
of their own land. Once these restrictive covenants in the form of
zoning laws are taken out from underneath the entire protection of
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:

SERVITUDES

§ 1.1 (2000)

(classifying easements as servitudes); Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law
of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982)
(grouping easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes into one
category collectively called "servitudes"). My earlier writings on this point are
Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906
(1988), and Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982).
35. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
36. Id. at 837.
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property, the question of whether they live or die in any individual
cases is subject to huge and pointless political struggles.
Thus with easements, the Supreme Court follows the rules
that on matters of valuation, which holds "the more you take, the
more you pay." Given that basic direction, the law of takings is
never concerned with how much of the original bundle of rights
remains after the government has taken its sticks. It only asks
what sticks were taken. So if you have 100 acres and the
government takes 60, it pays you for the 60 and you get to keep
the 40. The fine points come into play because in different settings
the 40 acres that remain could be worth either more or less than
40% of value. But once the discussion turns to covenants, then
this rule is junked. No longer does the government face a legal
regime that requires it to pay more when it takes more. That
approach is too simple. Instead the Supreme Court tries to
establish some permissible ratio between what is taken and what
is left over. Of course it does not tell us what number tips that
balance. All we know is that some major restrictions may be
imposed with impunity, so that the dominant incentive on local
governments is to stop just short of that imaginary line in the sand
when it restricts land use. Accordingly, the law raises this huge
discontinuity. Let local government put a little restriction on land,
and it pays nothing; restrict a little more, and it still pays nothing.
Perhaps the same technique applies several times. Then the local
government reaches that magic point, and once it gets up there,
Bingo! It pays for everything. Well, every single land use lawyer
knows this drill, and none of them like to lose at Bingo. So what
they do is put in place as much regulation as they can, so long as
their pay out obligation is zero. But occasionally they overreach,
which is why this game often ends in high stakes litigation.
CONCLUSION

The moral is clear. The right results depend on the right
starting point. Until the Justices of the Supreme Court recognize
that private law conceptions of private property ought to inform
the constitutional analysis, they will never get the analysis right.
Justice Brennan's magic system of property rights in Penn Central
was just the wrong place to begin. Occasionally there's a glimmer
of recognition, as in the Nollan case, which sought to place some
limitations on the state's ability to impose hard choices on
landowners. But in general, the decision of the Supreme Court to
embrace "ad hoc" determinations of takings law has a predictable
result: it makes a mess out of an area of law that is amenable to
great precision. It is surely time to start over. The Supreme
Court made a small step forward when it rejected the Agins test
which asked whether regulations substantially advanced a
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legitimate state interest. But it took a giant backwards when it
reaffirmed the confused and mischievous Penn Central standard.
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APPENDIX

§ 486H-10.4. Restrictions on manufacturers or jobbers in operating
service stations; lease rent controls; definitions.
(a) Beginning August 1, 1997, no manufacturer or jobber shall
convert an existing dealer retail station to a company retail station;
provided that nothing in this section shall limit a manufacturer or
jobber from:
(1) Continuing to operate any company operated retail service
stations legally in existence on July 31, 1997;
(2) Constructing and operating any new retail service stations as
company retail stations constructed after August 1, 1997, subject
to subsection (b); or
(3) Operating a former dealer retail station for up to twenty-four
months until a replacement dealer can be found if the former
dealer vacates the service station, cancels the franchise, or is
properly terminated or not renewed.
(b) No new company retail station shall be located within one-eighth
mile of a dealer retail station in an urban area, and within onequarter mile in other areas.
(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined in section 486H-1,
existing on August 1, 1997, or entered into thereafter, shall be
construed in conformity with the following:
(1) Such renewal shall not be scheduled more frequently than
once every three years; and
(2) Upon renewal, the lease rent payable shall not exceed fifteen
per cent of the gross sales, except for gasoline, which shall not
exceed fifteen per cent of the gross profit of product, excluding all
related taxes by the dealer operated retail service station as
defined in section 486H-1 and 486H-10.4 plus, in the case of a
retail service station at a location where the manufacturer or
jobber is the lessee and not the owner of the ground lease, a
percentage increase equal to any increase which the
manufacturer or jobber is required to pay the lessor under the
ground lease for the service station. For the purposes of this
subsection, "gross amount" means all monetary earnings of the
dealer from a dealer operated retail service station after all
applicable taxes, excluding income taxes, are paid.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any existing
contracts that may be in conflict with its provisions.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a dealer from selling a
retail service station in any manner.

